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Abstract
In conditions of the single monetary policy and the decentralised fiscal policy in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) it is necessary for the coordination of macroeconomic 
policy to be strengthened. The Treaty on European Union imposes conditions that relate to 
the size of the budgetary deficit and the public debt as criteria for the introduction of the 
euro in a given country. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) sets the fiscal framework 
of the European Monetary Union based on rules underpinned by these criteria.
Thus the SGP, as a kind of economic policy-coordination mechanism, has the task 
of ensuring fiscal discipline among the Member States of the EMU. The objective of this 
paper is to describe the recent reform of the Stability and Growth Pact that arose as a re-
sult of deficiencies observed in the original version of the Pact of 1997.
Key words: Stability and Growth Pact, European Monetary Union, coordination of 
monetary and fiscal policy, fiscal rules
1 Introduction 
A unique feature of the Economic and Monetary Union consists of the centralised 
monetary policy in the sphere of competence of the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the decentralised fiscal policy that remains within the accountability of the national gov-
ernments of the Member States. Healthy public finances contribute to the achievement 
and maintenance of price stability and hence of sustainable economic growth. Hence 
common rules for the running of fiscal policy at national level have been defined and 
laid down at EU level. These rules, that is, the outline of fiscal policy founded on rules, 
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are incorporated into the provisions of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 1992) 
and, more particularly, in the Stability and Growth Pact, SGP. These documents, the 
first one as part of primary and the second one as part of secondary EU law, lay down 
the fiscal criteria – size of the budgetary deficit and of the public debt – that EU Mem-
ber States have to satisfy in order to be able to bring in the euro as their national cur-
rency, in other words, for the achievement and maintenance of a stable budgetary posi-
tion within the EMU.
In the less than a decade that Member States and EU institutions have had experience 
with the provisions of the SGP, the need for the existence of such a fiscal framework has 
been confirmed. But during its use several flaws have shown up, which set off more fun-
damental study of the way it functions and the role of fiscal rules in the monetary union 
and finally led to the need for reform. The objective of this paper is to describe reform of 
the fiscal framework of the EU that occurred in 2005.
After the introduction, in part two of the paper, a brief description is given of the 
rules that relate to the sustainability of public finances in the EU, in which a distinction 
is made between the Treaty on European Union and the Stability and Growth Pact, which 
is at the same time an introduction into part three of the paper. This section discusses the 
circumstances in which modifications to the Pact occurred, reforms of the Pact are de-
scribed, and the basic features of the reform are discussed. The final part of the paper pro-
vides a conclusion.
2 Government finances in the European Union 
2.1 The Maastricht Treaty
The Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992 in Maastricht, the Netherlands, set 
the foundation for the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union and the European 
Central Bank, as well as laid down the criteria that EU Member States had to meet to be 
able to take part in the EMU. These are price stability, a stable fiscal position, exchange 
rate stability and convergence of long-term interest rates1.
The criteria of government finances are based on the principle of sustainable fiscal 
policy, which means a policy unlikely to increase the risk of a higher rate of inflation in 
the future. This risk is reflected in the likelihood that a government with a high debt-to-
GDP ratio might prefer a high rate of inflation and in this way reduce the real value of the 
public debt. Hence for the sake of maintaining price stability and an equitable distribution 
of the costs and benefits of monetary union it was essential to establish criteria to ensure 
that each member state would run a sound fiscal policy (Faulend et al., 2005).
The Treaty includes a written definition of fiscal policy that supports the common 
monetary policy:
1 See Treaty on European Union (consolidated text) Official Journal C 325 of December 24 2003. Denmark 
and the UK won a special status in this treaty (the so-called opt-out clause) exempting them from joining the EMU. 
States that became members of the EU after 1992 could not invoke the opt-out clause and are thus bound to intro-
duce the euro.
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•  the annual budgetary deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP, with the provison that in 
the assessment of the fulfilment of this criterion a budgetary deficit above but close 
to 3% can be tolerated if some temporary or exceptional event is concerned2;.
•  the public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP, and there is a certain amount of flex-
ibility in this criterion too, so it can also be considered to be satisfactory if a coun-
try with an exceptionally high debt/GDP ratio is approaching the reference value of 
60% at a satisfactory pace.
Apart from the fiscal criteria for the introduction of the euro, the Treaty contains other 
provisions that relate to public finances in the Member States. The provisions of Articles 
101-104 forbid the ECB and the national central banks to finance the government deficit, 
and also outlaw preferential access of public sector institutions to financial institutions. 
These provisions rule out any possibility of the EU or the EMU being responsible for the 
liabilities of Member States. This means that in the event of the insolvency of any finan-
cial institution, Member States of the EU (EMU) or some other state will not be consid-
ered responsible for the debt of the insolvent institution. In this manner the Treaty endeav-
oured to provide the conditions for stability, once established, to be maintained during the 
course of a country’s participation in the EMU.
2.2 Stability and Growth Pact
The understanding that sound public finances are a necessary condition for the 
achievement and preservation of overall macroeconomic stability entailed the need for a 
stable framework for fiscal policy based on the rules. The final agreement on the word-
ing of the Stability and Growth Pact was achieved in 1997. The Pact came into force on 
January 1 19993. The main preoccupation of the Pact is to put forward fiscal discipline as 
the fundamental characteristic of the EMU. Fiscal discipline will enable states that have 
introduced the euro to strengthen the conditions for price stability and sustainable growth 
and will contribute to the preservation of the economic environment in which the com-
mon monetary policy can be devoted to achieving price stability.
The SGP defines in more detail the definitions of the Treaty on European Union and 
defines a sound fiscal policy as that in which the budget should be close to balance or in 
surplus4. Such a fiscal position would enable sufficient space within normal cyclical fluc-
tuations for the fiscal deficit to be maintained within the borders of the reference value of 
3% of GDP. The Pact also states the role of the automatic stabilisers at the national level, 
which, in the conditions of the loss of the instrument of the exchange rate, help economies 
2 Definition and interpretation of the provision about “temporary and exceptional event” in the excessive defi-
cit procedure, EDP, was a topic of debates during the later reform of the Pact.
3 Looked at from the legal point of view, the Stability and Growth Pact consists of: Resolution of the Europe-
an Council on the SGP; Council Regulation on the strengthening of the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies, No. 1466/97; Council Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure, No. 1467/97; (Official Journal L 209, 02/08/1997), and the Council Regulation 1466/97 as amended by 
Council Regulation 1055/2005 and Council Regulation 1467/97 as amended by Council Regulation 1056/2005 (Offi-
cial Journal L 174, 07/07/2005).
4 In reform of the Pact there will be a closer definition of the concept of a budgetary position “close to balance 
or in surplus”
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to adjust to asymmetric shocks5. However, the advantages of the automatic stabilisers will 
be achieved only if the budgetary positions of the countries are sustainable.
The Pact contains elements of prevention – by regular supervision of the public fi-
nances it is the Pact’s objective to prevent budgetary deficits of members exceeding 3% 
of GDP; elements of dissuasion – in a situation in which a budgetary deficit does exceed 
the reference value of 3% of GDP, the Member State in question is asked to take correc-
tive measures, and if the budgetary deficit during the given period does not reduce, it is 
possible to impose sanctions6; and a political commitment - all the parties involved (the 
European Commission, the Council of the EU and the Member States) have assumed the 
obligation to assure full and prompt application of the government finances surveillance 
process. 
The documents that members of the EMU and members of the EU that have not yet 
introduced the euro prepare for the sake of the prevention of excessive deficits or in mul-
tilateral surveillance of public finances are the stability programmes and the convergence 
programmes. These programmes must represent the medium-term objective of the budg-
etary position and, if necessary, describe the way to reach such a position. The mainstay 
of the corrective part of the Pact is the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), which is de-
fined in the Maastricht Treaty, and explained by the Council regulation, of which there 
will be more later on in this paper.
3 Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact
3.1 Circumstances leading to the reform
In November 2003 the Council of the EU determined to suspend the EDP for Ger-
many and France, thus ignoring the recommendation of the European Commission  that 
both countries should adopt fiscal consolidation measures. After this move of the Coun-
cil, the European Commission referred to the European Court of Justice, for the Council 
of the EU had violated the procedure laid down in the provisions of the Pact.
This case was the culmination of several years of difficulties in implementing the 
Pact. The basic problem was the fact that the threat to impose sanctions was not credible. 
One of the main criticisms directed at the original version of the Pact was, then, its poor 
enforceability. This flaw was linked with the absence of any automaticity, that is, with 
the existence of discretionary decision making in the EDP7. The other flaw was that the 
original version of the Pact did not adequately incentivise countries to greater fiscal ac-
5 According to some studies, thanks to the working of the automatic stabilisers a 1 percentage point increase in 
real growth of GDP in the eurozone will increase the budgetary position by 0.5 percentage points of GDP on average 
(ECB, 2002). Flores et al. (2005) cast doubt on the effectiveness of the automatic stabilisers, which depends a great 
deal on the kind of shock the economy has to face.
6 Annet, Decressin and Deppler (2005) describe the difference between the preventive and the corrective part 
of the SGP. They say that the first one deals with maintaining a sound fiscal policy, while elements of dissuasion are 
aimed at avoiding errors in economic policy.
7 For more about discretionary decision making and the problem of implementation see Calmfors (2005). It is 
interesting that during the drafting of the Pact in 1996, it was Germany that sought a greater degree of automaticity 
particularly in the imposition of sanctions (Stark, 2001).
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countability in the various phases of the business cycle: fiscal discipline in the periods of 
upswing was inadequate to avoid high deficits in periods of severe cyclical downturns 
(Calmfors, 2005).
One of the causes of this state of affairs was probably the fact that fiscal consolida-
tion had not been fully completed by the time the EMU started working. In the period 
from the establishment of the criteria for the introduction of the euro until the actual in-
troduction of the currency in 1999, the EU countries had successfully carried out fiscal 
consolidation under pressure from the Maastricht criteria. They managed to bring their 
budgetary deficits down to the level lower than 3% of GDP, and the level of the public 
debt to below or close to 60% of GDP, that is, to start the trend towards debt reduction. In 
this period, in almost all the Member States improvements in budgetary positions were 
recorded, particularly in those that at the beginning of the 1990s had had levels of budg-
etary deficit in double-digits figures. However, the process of fiscal consolidation at the 
beginning of 1999 was not completed. Some countries joined the eurozone with budget-
ary deficits only a little lower than 3% of GDP8. They were far from the objective defined 
as “close to balance or in surplus”. The same thing applied to public debts: although the 
levels of public debt had started to decrease, they were nevertheless, in a large number of 
countries, still considerably above the 60% of GDP level.
Notwithstanding the propitious economic climate at the very beginning of the creation 
of the EMU, most countries did not manage to carry on the process of budgetary consol-
idation. There was also a difference between the larger and smaller states in the Union – 
while some of the smaller countries had managed to achieve a balanced budgetary posi-
tion, most of the big countries of the eurozone did not manage to improve their cyclical-
ly-adjusted budgetary positions. In the last few years a slowdown in the growth of GDP 
was considered the main factor in the weakening of the budgetary positions of the old 
Member States of the EU. However, this development can also be linked with the discre-
tionary fiscal measures, and the deficiency of political will.
Not long after the Council had announced that there was a need to strengthen and clar-
ify the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact for the sake of encouraging trans-
parency and national ownership of the fiscal framework, the European Commission tested 
out the ways in which the flaws of the existing fiscal framework could be repaired9.
3.2 The basic features of the reform
The basic feature of the reform of the SGP is that the quantitative constraints of the 
original Pact – a budgetary deficit of at most 3% of GDP and a public debt of at most 60% 
of GDP – were to remain unchanged. However, modified rules gave a somewhat differ-
ent definition of the medium-term budgetary objective, taking into account diversities in 
8 Here it is worth remembering the example of Greece and its resort to “creative accounting” in the area of govern-
ment finances. For fiscal consolidation on the eve of the beginning of the EMU see European Commission (2004a).
9 See European Commission (2004b). The Communication of the Commission of September 2004, together 
with a large number of previous papers about the topic of improvement and necessary revisions of the SGP (see Buti, 
Eijffinger and Franco, 2003a; 2003b), was the foundation for the development of many possible scenarios for a revi-
sion of the SGP.
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economic situation and budgetary positions of Member States and the impact of the age-
ing of the population on government finances over the long term.
The medium-term objective in the new version of the Pact, just as in the original ver-
sion, is defined as structural (cyclically-adjusted) deficit, net of one-off and temporary 
measures. The first novelty was that the budgetary objectives in the medium term were 
to be reviewed every four years (and also after the application of any important structural 
reforms), so as to reflect potential growth, fiscal sustainability and the dynamics of pub-
lic debt. The second new departure was that countries with lower public debts and higher 
growth potentials were permitted a budgetary deficit of 1% of GDP in the medium term10. 
Highly indebted countries with lower potentials for growth had to aim at a balanced budg-
et or a surplus. From countries with a public debt greater than 100% of GDP, an explicitly 
positive budgetary bottom line is required.
Central elements of reform also include the requirement for the strengthening of the 
fiscal positions during “good years”, good years being considered those in which GDP 
was above the potential level. In this part of the fiscal framework there is a special em-
phasis on the aim of the reform being to take early corrective measures – it is anticipated 
that countries should, during good years, reduce their budgetary deficit by 0.5 percentage 
points of GDP. It is also envisaged that the minimum budgetary effort in years of eco-
nomic upswing should be greater than this, while in periods of low growth or recession 
it could be lower.
The Council also managed to broker an agreement on the treatment of structural re-
forms that in the short term tended to lead to deterioration in public finances, but over the 
long term would improve their sustainability. They were to be taken into consideration in 
the definition of the path to achieving the medium-term objective for those countries that 
had not yet achieved it and for those that temporarily did not comply with it. Only those 
structural reforms that had direct long-term effects on cost reduction could be taken into 
consideration, an additional condition being that the 3% of GDP constraint be still re-
spected, and that during a programme period of four years the budgetary position be re-
turned to the medium-term objective. This rule particularly referred to the reforms of the 
pension funds of the Member States. Structural reforms would have to be expounded and 
justified in detail in the convergence and the stability programmes.
The early warning system was part of the preventive elements into which changes 
were also brought. In the Report of the EU Council on improvement of the implementa-
tion of the SGP it is said that for the strengthening of the preventive character of the Pact, 
it is necessary to explain and expand the existing early warning mechanism. From this 
point of view, it was provided for that the European Commission should directly, without 
any involvement of the Council, give policy advice to those in charge of economic policy 
concerned with the realisation of the agreed on medium-term budgetary objective. How-
ever, the European Commission will be able to issue these early warning notices only 
when the EU Constitution has come into force.
10 New countries, as catching-up economies, have higher potential growth and a higher rate of inflation (thanks 
to the Balassa-Samulson effect) and could stand higher levels of fiscal deficit without menacing the long-term sus-
tainability of public finances (see Organ and Szapary, 2004).
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In the part of the Pact that contains elements of correction, the main changes are in a 
definition of excessive deficit that covers the role of “other relevant factors” and a revi-
sion of the concept of “a serious economic downturn”11; the possibility for extending the 
deadlines for a correction of the deficit; greater focus to public debt and sustainability of 
public finances, and consideration of structural reforms in the context of the EDP. The 
Council pointed out that the EDP, whatever the changes, had to remain simple, transpar-
ent, equitable, and lead to a rapid adjustment of the deficit. Just like “other relevant fac-
tors”, so the redefined concept of a serious fall of economic activity can be applied only 
on condition that it refers to a budgetary deficit close to the reference value and, in addi-
tion, temporary in its nature (see below).
The modified Pact contains several situations in which exceeding the budgetary limit 
will be tolerated. These are structural reforms and “other relevant factors” including ex-
penditures for research and development, objectives of European policy (particularly in 
the context of accomplishing the Lisbon strategy), international solidarity, capital invest-
ment, reforms of the pension systems and extremely high EU dues. In deciding whether 
a country is in a situation of excessive deficit or not attention has to be paid to develop-
ment of the medium term budgetary position, particularly to efforts to achieve fiscal con-
solidation in “good years”; the sustainability of the public debt; public investment and the 
overall quality of government finances. It has to be said that the concept of the “other rel-
evant factors” also exists in the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht, but was not often 
applied. In its Report on improving the implementation of the SGP, the Council said that 
other relevant factors could be taken into consideration only if the breach of the 3% ref-
erence value was temporary and still within reach of the 3% value. Furthermore, exces-
sive deficit, except in cases when the economy slowed down very considerably or of re-
cession would be permissible in cases of a “protracted period of economic stagnation” 
and “very low growth”.
The new departures relating to the “other relevant factors” are considered to be per-
haps the most important loosening of the Pact (Buti, 2006; Calmfors, 2005). In favour 
of such an opinion is the fact that a fairly broad scope of interpretation can be applied to 
other relevant factors, and so member countries are themselves entitled to consider cer-
tain factors important and thus to be taken into account in the EDP. Apart from that, there 
is no definition of what “close to the reference value” means with respect to the other rel-
evant factors, except that this concept can be applied only if the divergence is temporary 
and anyway close to the reference value.
Modifications to the Stability and Growth Pact regulations envisaged an extension 
of the period for the reduction of the budgetary deficit to a level below 3% in exception-
al circumstances, from one to two years. In determining an appropriate period for the 
correction of a deficit, care will be taken of the “other relevant factors” and of whether 
the minimum fiscal effort of 0.5 GDP percentage points per year has been taken. The 
11 The original Pact defines a “a serious economic downturn” as a fall of real GDP by 2% or more in a year. The 
Council of the EU can use its own discretionary decision to determine that this is an exceptional event or not and in 
line with this whether the country in question is in the situation of an excessive deficit. According to the changed Pact, 
there is even more room for interpretation of a serious fall of economic activity – such is the example of a negative 
rate of growth or accumulated fall of GDP during a period of low growth as compared to the potential.
290
A. Šabić: Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact
Financial Theory and Practice 30 (3), 283-293 (2006)
deadlines are extended in other places in the EDP as well: the period for decision mak-
ing about the existence of an excessive deficit in a given country is extended from 3 to 
4 months; the period for undertaking effective actions in response to a recommenda-
tion of the Council is extended from 4 to 6 months; the period in which a country with 
an excessive deficit is sent a notification to undertake the measures necessary to amend 
the situation is extended by 1 month; and the period for undertaking measures after the 
Council has sent a warning according to Article 104(9) of the Treaty on European Union 
has been extended from 2 to 4 months; the total maximum period in which the Coun-
cil has to make a decision about imposing sanctions in the case of a eurozone coun-
try not meeting the recommendations and decisions of the Council has been extended 
from 10 to 16 months. A new departure introduced by the revised Pact is that it is pos-
sible to retake steps in the EDP. The first recommendation of the Council that an exces-
sive deficit should be corrected, and a later warning that effective measures should be 
taken to reduce the deficit, can be repeated and reshaped if during the course of the cur-
rent EDP there were some unexpected negative economic trends and if a member state 
had applied certain earlier recommendations that nevertheless did not result in a reduc-
tion of the deficit.
The revised provisions of the Pact bring into focus the problem of the sustainabili-
ty of the public debt and charge the Council with preparing recommendations about debt 
dynamics in its opinion about stability and convergence programmes. This would lead to 
fuller implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on European Union, and the frame-
work for surveillance of a debt should be strengthened by the concept of “sufficient di-
minishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace” for the public debt, 
taking into account the macroeconomic conditions and debt dynamics. The modified Pact 
did not define this concept in greater detail. 
Modified provisions also reflect concern for the reforms of the pension systems. 
The Commission and the Council of the EU when assessing whether a Member State 
has managed to reduce its budgetary deficit will take into account the costs of such re-
forms. The development of the nominal budgetary deficit and the net costs related with 
the application of the second pillar of pension system will be compared. During the 
first five years from the beginning of the reform, the amounts of the budgetary deficit 
will be adjusted by the net costs of the reforms carried out. The adjustment will be car-
ried out for 100% of the amount of the net costs of reform in the first year, for 80% in 
the second year and so on until the fifth year, when adjustment will be made for 20% 
of the next costs of the reform. In states that have already carried out a reform of the 
pension system, this mechanism of allowing the costs of reform during five years will 
be applied retroactively, starting from 2006. Although these provisions are shaped in 
such a way as to provide for long-term sustainability of the pensions system, there are 
particularly crucial for the new Member States, which recently started out on reforms 
of their pension systems and which are in a situation of excessive deficit. For this rea-
son such a treatment of the reform of the second pillar of the pension system could af-
fect the assessment of the fulfilment of the convergence criteria (European Commis-
sion, 2005).
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These modifications in the corrective elements of the Pact could be characterised as a 
considerably weakening of the corrective dimension in the Pact12. It is held that frequent 
use of the clause about “other relevant factors” could jeopardise the 3% of GDP reference 
value, and that the absence of any firm constraint might set off future growth in deficits.
4 What can be expected from the modified Pact?
Several features of the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact might affect the future 
functioning of the fiscal framework of the EMU. Reform has increased the complexity 
of the excessive deficit procedure, which is a departure from the simplicity that is one of 
the much-emphasised advantages of the original version of the SGP. In this manner, the 
transparency of the whole framework has also been reduced, and the risk of ambiguous 
interpretations and discretionary powers of Member States, the European Commission 
and the Council of the EU has been increased. From the viewpoint of the theory on opti-
mum fiscal rules it can be said that in one part of the Pact a certain departure from good 
rules has been made13. At the same time, the better economic foundation of the rules of 
the Pact – primarily the differentiation of the medium-term budgetary objective and the 
explicitly set demand for minimum fiscal effort – means an advance. Also worth men-
tioning is that there is a certain trade-off between flexibility on the one hand and simplic-
ity and enforceability on the other.
It is interesting how the European Central Bank understands the changes described14. 
The ECB thinks it imperative that all three parties – the Member States, the European 
Commission and the Council of the EU – should apply the revised framework in a rigor-
ous and consistent manner. It also says firmly that the fiscal framework of the EMU has 
to remain clear, simple and applicable in order to ensure transparency and equal treatment 
in the application of the Pact. In general, the ECB is “seriously concerned” because of 
the changes and says that the excessive deficit procedure should be effective and credi-
ble. Hence the ECB does not support the changes in the Regulation on speeding up and 
implementing the excessive deficit procedure. But it does support the intention to im-
prove multilateral surveillance and coordination of economic policies among member 
countries from the modification of the Regulation adopted in 1997.
Criticising the revised Pact for the weakening of its strength, Calmfors (2005) points 
out that the aspect of the reform that gives most cause for concern is not the real chang-
es but the fact that rules are endogenous and that they can be changed again, particularly 
if one of the big countries infringes them. Such a development can lead to serious conse-
quences for the credibility of the whole framework for the future.
12 The ECB and the German Central Bank had particularly harsh criticisms of this part of the reform of the SGP 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2005).
13 Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003a; 2003b) consider SGP from the standpoint of the criteria for ideal fiscal 
rules (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). One should, however, mention that these criteria are formed for an assessment 
of domestic fiscal rules, and that the multinational character of the SGP will affect individual criteria (particularly the 
implementation of the rules).
14 At the request of the European Commission, the ECB made a statement including an opinion about the reforms 
agreed on (ECB, 2005b).
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We can conclude that the important changes in the section relating to the excessive 
deficit procedure can be explained as a loosening of the corrective dimension of the Pact 
and as greater tolerance for excessive deficits, which could lead to a weakening of fiscal 
discipline in future. For this reason all parties that in the preparation of the reform con-
firmed their political will and bound themselves to respect the rules should behave respon-
sibly and with discipline, literally apply the provisions of the Pact, and by so doing help 
the European Central Bank in the preservation of monetary stability.
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